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Abstract Gauge symmetries provide one of the most puzzling examples of the
applicability of mathematics in physics. The presented work focuses on the role
of analogical reasoning in the gauge argument, motivated by Mark Steiner’s claim
that the application of the gauge principle relies on a Pythagorean analogy whose
success undermines naturalist philosophy. In this paper, we present two different
views concerning the analogy between gravity, electromagnetism, and nuclear in-
teractions, each providing a different philosophical response to the problem of the
applicability of mathematics in the natural sciences. The first is based on an account
of Weyl’s original work, which first gave rise to the gauge principle. Drawing on
his later philosophical writings, we develop an idelaist reading of the mathematical
analogies in the gauge argument. On this view, mathematical analogies serve to
ensure a conceptual harmony in our scientific account of nature. We further discuss
the construction of Yang and Mills’s gauge theory in light of this idealist reading.
The second account presents a naturalist alternative, formulated in terms of John
Norton’s account of a material analogy, according to which the analogy succeeds
in virtue of a physical similarity between the different interactions. This account is
based on the methodological equivalence principle, a simple conceptual extension
of the gauge principle that allows us to understand the relation between coordinate
transformations and gravity as a manifestation of the same method. The physical sim-
ilarity between the different cases is based on attributing the success of this method
to the dependence of the coupling on relational physical quantities. We conclude by
reflecting on the advantages and limits of the idealist, naturalist, and anthropocentric
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Pythagorean views, as three alternative ways to understand the puzzling relation
between mathematics and physics.
1 Introduction
The relationship between theoretical physics and mathematics underwent a dramatic
change during the 20th century. The mathematical machinery employed by physicists
became on the one hand more abstract and detached from the observed phenomena,
and on the other hand more strongly intertwined with scientific thought about the
world. The language of mathematics, it seemed to many, became the only language
through which some central aspects of physical reality can be appropriately de-
scribed. A common view regards this process as a step forward in the formulation
of a scientific worldview that is indifferent to the human perspective. Mark Steiner’s
Applicability (Steiner, 1998) forms a major attack on this naturalist view. In contrast
to the Galilean-Newtonian revolution, identified with a ‘revolt against anthropocen-
trism’ (p. 56), Steiner argues that the mathematical methodology of modern physics
is based on an implicit anthropocentric belief.
Steiner’s starting point is the sense of wonder expressed by many physicists with
respect to the successful applicability of mathematics in physics. He presents a
detailed and original analysis of the kinds of mathematical reasoning that lay at
the heart of some of the most significant discoveries in modern physics. Steiner
concludes that from a naturalist point of view, physicists are right when they regard
the effectiveness of mathematics as a miracle; the process of formulating the laws
governing our most successful theories has often been based on purely mathematical
considerations—considerations that do not seem to have any physical justification.
What makes the applicability of mathematics in physics particularly remarkable
according to Steiner is the role that mathematics plays in scientific discovery. Here,
physicists often appeal to mathematics to guess the laws that apply to an unknown
and not directly observable domain.2 Steiner provides a detailed analysis of various
examples of such reasoning, and suggests that they are best understood as an appeal
to analogy. He argues that the analogies underwriting much of twentieth century
physics were explicitly Pythagorean in nature—i.e. analogies that cannot be ex-
pressed in any language other than mathematics. On Steiner’s view, the problem for
the naturalist is that this form of reasoning is inherently anthropocentric. Mathematics
is an endeavour guided by human values, defined by an appeal to simplicity, beauty,
and convenience, which are all anthropocentric notions. It is this anthropocentric
grounding that makes the success of such considerations seem miraculous; the world,
according to Steiner (1998, p. 176), appears to be “user friendly”.
Steiner’s argument is based on a distinction that he draws between mathemat-
ical reasoning, which concerns relations between abstract concepts, and physical
reasoning, which concerns relations between objects in the world. In an appeal to
2 Steiner’s analysis focuses on reasoning that is non-deductive, i.e. one that is expressed in mathe-
matical language, but does not rely solely on logical inference.
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Pythagorean analogies, Steiner argues, physicists apply mathematical reasoning to
discover (i.e. successfully guess) facts about the world—a move for which there can
be no naturalist justification.
In evaluating Steiner’s argument, the question is not only whether his unique
form of anthropocentric Pythagoreanism is compelling, but whether the examples
taken to support this claim resist an alternative reading. Broadly speaking, there are
two possible strategies for presenting an alternative reading of the applicability of
mathematics in physics. One is to deny the anthropocentric view of mathematics,
and regard it (or at least the mathematics used in physics) as something that has
been shaped by the standards of natural science itself. The other is to accept the
anthropocentric view of mathematics, and hold the same view of physics, at least to
a certain extent. The mathematical description of nature, according to this strategy,
does not reflect the way nature is, but rather our way of understanding it. These
strategies can be identified with two different schools of philosophical thought: the
first would generally aim to deny (or at least to minimize) the significance of a
priori principles. The second would regard such principles as fundamental to human
thought (mathematics and science included). We shall correspondingly refer to the
two strategies as naturalist and idealist, respectively.
In this paper, we will look to develop each of these alternatives responses. In par-
ticular, we will do so within the context of Steiner’s strongest example of Pythagorean
reasoning in physics: a famous symmetry principle known as the gauge argument.
We will present two different readings of the gauge argument, contrasting them with
each other and with Steiner’s account. The first follows the idealist strategy, the
second follows the naturalist one.
In the development of modern physics, the gauge argument became the primary
tool for formulating the laws of fundamental physical interactions. The idea became
a central methodological principle in physics following the work of Yang and Mills
(1954) who suggested a theory of nuclear interaction by drawing an explicit analogy
to the structure of the electromagnetic interaction. Yang and Mills’s gauge argument
is based on the requirement that every global symmetry of the dynamical law should
also hold as a local (i.e. spacetime dependent) symmetry.3 The long familiar local
gauge invariance of electromagnetism, commonly understood as a reflection of
a redundancy in the mathematical description of each physically possible state,
became the template for all of the fundamental interactions in the standard model
of particle physics. However, the gauge argument actually originated much earlier
in Weyl’s 1918 attempt to provide a unified understanding of electromagnetism
and gravity (as described by Einstein’s general theory of relativity). The history
and methodology of the gauge argument is thus rooted in an analogy between the
mathematical descriptions of gravity, electromagnetism, and the nuclear interactions.
In his [1989], Steiner singled out the formal nature of the analogical reasoning that
gave rise to Yang-Mills theory as an anomaly requiring philosophical attention, and
later in the Applicability [1998] he portrayed this reasoning as the quintessential
Pythagorean analogy.
3 Here, note that a symmetry of a dynamical law is a transformation of the values of the variables
under which the form of the equation expressing the law remains invariant.
4 Guy Hetzroni and Noah Stemeroff
Steiner’s analysis of the gauge argument anticipated a series of philosophical
debates concerning the significance and meaning of gauge symmetries. The central
issue in these debates is the invocation of considerations that appear to be devoid
of physical content, as a gauge symmetry is commonly understood to be a mere
reflection of a mathematical redundancy in our representation of nature. However,
the gauge argument has served as a basis for the formulation of novel and success-
ful physical theories, and the generation of new knowledge. This tension between
the descriptive redundancy at the core of the gauge argument and its foundational
significance presents us with a deep philosophical puzzle concerning the nature of
modern gauge theories. While this puzzle mirrors Steiner’s challenge concerning the
applicability of mathematics in the gauge argument, little attention has been given to
the connection between these issues. One of the aims of this paper is to try to draw
these two strands of philosophical discussion together.
The two approaches presented in this paper form two alternative ways of under-
standing the gauge argument as a form of analogical reasoning. The first provides
an idealist response to Steiner’s argument, based on Weyl’s original idealist justi-
fication of the gauge methodology. According to this approach, the mathematical
analogies underwriting gauge theory serve to extend the constitutive principles of a
theoretical framework for physical inquiry. In drawing a mathematical analogy, we
do not highlight an existing similarity, but rather construct it. The second account
is a naturalist alternative that portrays the analogical aspects of the different inter-
actions as a manifestation of a shared physical property. This property is rooted in
an ontology based on relational quantities (in agreement with the recent portrayal
of gauge symmetries by Rovelli, 2014). On this view, the dominance of analogical
reasoning does present, prima facie at least, a particular challenge to the naturalist;
a challenge that the naturalist can best confront by adopting a piecemeal approach,
reflecting on the methodology of a given successful analogy in an attempt to show
that its success can be grounded in physical properties of the world.
In what follows, we will begin by presenting Steiner’s general problem (Section
2) and the gauge argument, together with the philosophical problems it invokes
(Section 3). We then turn to present the two alternatives. The idealist understanding
of gauge (Section 4) and a naturalist one (Section 5). We will then provide a general
discussion of the limits of each of the presented approaches and the extent to which
they resolve Steiner’s problem.
2 Mathematical Analogies in Physics
Analogical reasoning has always been an essential part of physics, and has undoubt-
edly contributed to the formulation of a number of physical theories throughout
the history of science. Joseph Priestley (1775), for example, appealed to an anal-
ogy between gravitation and electricity to formulate an inverse square law for the
electrostatic force. William Thomson drew an analogy between the flow of heat and
electromagnetism, and used it to derive a set of novel dynamical equations govern-
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ing electromagnetic phenomena (see Hon and Goldstein (2020) chapter 3). These
examples already present cases of analogical inference from one physical domain
to another based on a conjectured similarity in their physical structure. This simi-
larity was taken to underwrite the postulation of a shared formal (i.e. mathematical)
representation.
However, with Maxwell the method of reasoning through mathematical analogy
was greatly extended to treat not only physical but also imagined systems. Famously,
Maxwell appealed to an analogy with an imaginary incompressible fluid to provide a
mathematical account of Faraday’s lines of force. He referred to this analogy between
an imaginary and a physical system as a “mathematical analogy”, contrasting it with
Thomson’s “physical analogy”. Of course, in both cases one typically appeals to an
analogy to draw a mathematical inference. The key difference is that in the case of
a physical analogy it is the observable similarity between the physical domains that
supports the inference, and in the case of a mathematical analogy it is a conjectured
similarity between a fictional and a physical domain.
According to Hon and Goldstein (2012, 2020) Maxwell’s methodology of mathe-
matical analogy was one of the first instances of the practice of scientific modelling.
Steiner (1998, p. 78) also uses the term ‘model’ in his account of Maxwell’s rea-
soning. However, he describes the development of Maxwell’s thought as a process
in which “the model gradually lost its appeal”, such that only the mathematics re-
mained. Steiner concludes that “Maxwell’s reasoning was Pythagorean. By this I
mean that once he had a mathematical structure which described many different
phenomena of electricity and magnetism, the mathematical structure itself, rather
than anything underlying it, defined the analogy between the different phenomena.”
This new Pythagorean strategy is thus based on drawing analogies between fictional
mathematical concepts associated with different physical domains.
This strategy, according to Steiner, became increasingly significant in theoretical
physics with the advent of quantum theory. Physicists were confronted with the
prospect of describing an imperceptible quantum reality, one that appeared to obey
laws that were drastically different from those of classical theories. As a result,
Steiner argues, physicists began to reason by mathematical analogy, i.e. to look
for laws that were mathematically similar to the classical ones they were trying to
replace.
In the context of quantum theory, Steiner suggests that the analogies that guided
the development of the theory were neither ‘physical’ nor simply ‘mathematical’,
they were Pythagorean—i.e. not expressible outside the language of mathematics.
In contrast to Priestley’s and Thomson’s analogies, here there was nothing but the
conjectured mathematical similarity to justify the analogy. It is mathematics itself
that “provided the framework for guessing the laws of the atomic world” (1998, p.
4). The construction of Schrödinger’s equation, the basic law of quantum mechanics,
is one prominent example of this strategy, as it was based on an analogy between a
complex function (conjectured to describe material particles) and the mathematical
properties of waves.
The problem, as Steiner sees it, is that this form of reasoning is inherently anthro-
pocentric. The naturalist has no reason to think that purely mathematical reasoning
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could serve as the basis for identifying physical similarities. Yet, this Pythagorean
strategy has been incredibly successful. The central thesis of the Applicability is that
naturalism is inconsistent with this appeal to Pythagorean analogies.
In addition, Steiner also notes that the Pythagorean strategy further blurs the
border between the physical and the mathematical in a deeper sense. Physicists often
assume that a mathematical fact corresponds to an actual physical possibility. For
example, it is a mathematical fact that (provided certain conditions) the product space
of a vector space of dimension two and a vector space of dimension three is a vector
space that is isomorphic to the sum space of a vector space of dimension two and a
vector space of dimension four. From this mathematical fact, according to Steiner’s
analysis, physicists conclude that there is a possible physical process in which two
particles, a pion (whose isospin space is three-dimensional) and a nucleon (whose
isospin space is two-dimensional), are transformed into a quantum superposition of
a Lambda baryon (whose isospin space is four-dimensional) and a nucleon.
The reasoning here, according to Steiner (p. 90), is an appeal to the “Pythagorean
hypothesis”, according to which mathematical equivalence is physical equivalence.
The relation here is not between two physical systems, but rather directly between
mathematical and physical facts. Thus, while the main focus of Applicability is on
Pythagorean methods in theoretical physics, Steiner also outlines a metaphysical
form of Pythagoreanism, stating that at least some of the ultimate natural kinds of
science are those of mathematics.
3 What is Gauge?
The gauge theory of Yang and Mills (1954) provides the methodological basis for
the construction of the standard model of particle physics, spelling out the idea that
“symmetry dictates interactions” (Yang, 1980). The principle, presented in parallel
as a methodological principle also by Utiyama (1956), states that we should promote
every global symmetry to a local symmetry. Namely, when we are faced with a
dynamical law whose form remains unaltered by a transformation of the variables
that is uniform over space and time, we should require (by altering the law) invariance
under the non-uniform (spacetime dependent) counterpart of the transformation. The
requirement for invariance with respect to the local symmetries is said to force the
introduction of fields and constrain their modes of interaction. Analogical reasoning
played a significant role at each stage of the development of the gauge principle:
first, by Weyl, through an analogy between gravity and electromagnetism and later,
by Yang and Mills, through an analogy between electromagnetism and the nuclear
interaction.
Steiner holds that the development of Yang-Mills Theory was based on an appeal
to a Pythagorean analogy, and that Weyl’s earlier versions of the gauge principle were
a step in the development of this form of mathematical reasoning. In this section,
we briefly describe the evolution of the concept of gauge symmetry, and then the
relevant philosophical discussion on their significance.
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3.1 A Brief History of the Gauge Principle
The concept of a ‘gauge invariance’ was first introduced by Hermann Weyl (1918).
The paper starts with a discussion of the geometrical foundations of general relativity.
Weyl complains that the theory contains a “residual element of rigid geometry” (p.
25), the metric, 𝑔`a , which allows for the magnitude of two vectors to be compared
at two distant points. In other words, upon translation (from one point in spacetime to
another) a vector may change its direction but not its length. However, this seemed to
contradict the ‘local’ nature of the theory. To Weyl, the local choice of measurement
standard, or ‘gauge’, should be just as arbitrary as the choice of a coordinate system.
This arbitrary choice could be described by the multiplication of all lengths by
some spacetime dependent scale factor, _(𝑥). To account for this freedom in the
choice of gauge, Weyl argued that the theory of general relativity ought to have
a double invariance. First, it should be invariant under the usual arbitrary smooth
coordinate transformations. Second, it should be invariant under an arbitrary scale
transformation of the metric 𝑔`a (𝑥) → _𝑔`a (𝑥), where _(𝑥) > 0.
However, this conformal structure must be supplemented to describe the con-
tinuous change in magnitudes due to parallel transport. In this purely infinitesimal
geometry, Weyl notes that the metrical connection over spacetime will depend not
only on the quadratic form 𝑑𝑠2 = 𝑔`a𝑑𝑥`𝑑𝑥a , but also on an additional linear form
𝑑𝑙 = 𝐴`𝑑𝑥
`. It is this ‘length connection’ 𝐴` that allows for length comparisons
between two infinitesimally close points. A change of gauge would then correspond
to a change in the representation of this connection. Surprisingly, Weyl suggested
that given the formal similarity between the curvature tensor that one can derive
from this ‘length connection’ and the structure of the electromagnetic field, we
could interpret the length connection, 𝐴`, as the electromagnetic potential. The
result was striking, as from a purely geometrical perspective, gravity and electro-
magnetism could now be seen to “spring from the same source” (p. 25). Indeed,
Weyl showed that “just as [...] the four conservation laws of matter (of the energy
momentum tensor [i.e. ∇`𝑇 `a = 0]) are connected with the invariance of the Ac-
tion with respect to coordinate transformations, expressed through four independent
functions, the electromagnetic conservation law [i.e. ∇` 𝑗 ` = 0] is connected with
the new scale-invariance, expressed through a fifth arbitrary function” (p. 32, em-
phasis in original). Thus, through imposing a form of gauge invariance, Weyl was
able to derive the equations governing the electromagnetic field and unify gravity
and electromagnetism.
Despite this profound result, Weyl’s 1918 gauge theory was taken to be empir-
ically inadequate, due to the non-integrability of the scale factor, and the resulting
path-dependence. As Einstein was quick to point out, this seemed to contradict the
observed fixed spacing of atomic spectral lines. Weyl disagreed, but with the advent
of quantum theory, he had already begun to reconsider his attempts to ground a uni-
fied field theory on a purely geometrical foundation. However, with the development
of quantum theory, Weyl’s notion of a ‘gauge invariance’ was found to reemerge in
a surprising new setting—i.e. the complex amplitude of the wave-funtion (London,
1927).
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In his 1929, Weyl took up this suggestion and set out to formulate a gauge
theory that embraced gravity, electromagnetism, and matter in the new context of
the developing quantum theory. Here, he (p. 121-122) notes that the “Dirac field-
equations for 𝜓 together with the Maxwell equations for the four potentials 𝜙`
of the electromagnetic field have an invariance property which is formally similar
to the one which I called gauge-invariance in my 1918 theory of gravitation and
electromagnetism”. The key point is that “𝜓 now plays the role that Einstein’s 𝑑𝑠
played before.”—i.e. it is only determined up to a ‘gauge-factor’ 𝑒𝑖_. Weyl notes
that if this gauge factor was ‘localized’, as in his 1918 theory, i.e. 𝑒𝑖_ → 𝑒𝑖_(𝑥) ,
then the invariance requirement can be maintained by introducing 𝑖𝐴`, an imaginary
counterpart of the 1918 connection form.
Through the ‘localization’ of the symmetry, one is required to introduce a new
connection, a so-called ‘gauge field’. Once more, given the formal similarity between
the curvature tensor that one derives from this connection and the structure of the
electromagnetic field, Weyl suggested that we could again associate the gauge field,
𝐴`, with the electromagnetic potential. But in this case, he was able to demonstrate
that the problematic path-dependence that plagued his original theory is no longer a
concern due to the fact that the phase factor lacks direct physical significance.
By the end of the 1920s, Weyl was able to clarify the sense in which the elec-
tromagnetic field and its interaction with charged particles can be derived from a
form of gauge invariance. From this result, he formulated what is now known as the
‘gauge principle’ (e.g. see Weyl, 1928/1931, p. 100). Weyl’s ‘gauge principle’ was
further developed by Pauli (1980/1933,1941) in his influential review articles, and
was formally divorced from its origins in general relativity. It was in this form that
the gauge argument was widely disseminated in the physics community.
The foundation of modern gauge theories was laid down in a famous paper
by Yang and Mills (1954), who sought to describe the strong nuclear interaction
between nucleons (protons and neutrons). Here, they further developed Heisenberg’s
suggestion that, given their roughly equivalent mass, the proton and neutron may
actually be two states of the same particle, differing only in their ‘isotopic spin’
state.4 At the time, isotopic spin appeared to be a conserved quantity, and Yang and
Mills (1954, p. 192) noted that the conservation of isotopic spin could be related to
the invariance of all interactions under global isotopic spin rotation.
However, they point out that this global condition “is not consistent with the
localized field concept that underlies the usual physical theories [...] ” (p. 192).
The violation of this locality desideratum motivates them to promote the global
symmetry to a localized symmetry, aiming to “explore the possibility of requiring
all interactions to be invariant under independent rotations of the isotopic spin at all
spacetime points, so that the relative orientation of the isotopic spin at two space-
time points becomes a physically meaningless quantity”. The analogical reasoning
is explicit in the way they motivate this suggestion:
4 Isotopic spin (or isospin) is an abstract space in which the directions correspond to different kinds
of particles (protons and neutrons in the original theory). Rotations in this abstract space are defined
by analogy to the rotation of the spin property of particles.
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We wish to point out that an entirely similar situation arises with respect to the ordinary
gauge invariance of a charged field which is described by a complex wave function 𝜓. A
change of gauge means a change of phase factor 𝜓 → 𝜓′, 𝜓′ = (exp 𝑖𝛼)𝜓, a change that
is devoid of any physical consequences. Since 𝜓 may depend on 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, and 𝑡 , the relative
phase factor of 𝜓 at two different space-time points is therefore completely arbitrary. In
other words, the arbitrariness in choosing the phase factor is local in character.
We define isotopic gauge as an arbitrary way of choosing the orientation of the isotopic spin
axes at all spacetime points, in analogy with the electromagnetic gauge which represents
an arbitrary way of choosing the complex phase factor of a charged field at all space-time
points.
The desired local isospin gauge invariance is then achieved, once again in analogy
to electromagnetism, by the introduction of a new gauge field 𝐵`. Like in the
electromagnetic case, the new field functions in the equations as a geometrical
connection, i.e. it can define parallel transport of isospin directions along paths in
spacetime. The requirement for gauge invariance, Yang and Mills claim, uniquely
defines how this field interacts with itself and any field carrying isotopic spin.
While the proposal itself did not succeed as a theory of the strong nuclear inter-
action, physicists in the 60s and 70s continued to use Yang and Mills’s method in the
construction of new theories of the nuclear interactions. A central motivation was
the conjectured renormalizability of theories of this type (see, for example, Kibble,
2015; Veltman, 1997).5 These theories turned out to be particularly successful, both
empirically, and in providing unified description of elementary particles and the
electromagnetic and nuclear interactions among them.
Despite the historical roots of the gauge argument in Einstein’s general theory of
relativity, it is still a matter of debate whether and how gravity can be understood in
a gauge-theoretical framework.6 These questions are closely intertwined with fun-
damental questions on space and time as well as with ongoing attempts to formulate
a unified field theory encompassing all known interactions.
3.2 Is Gauge a Pythagorean Analogy?
Steiner cites the history of gauge theory as the one of the clearest examples of
Pythagorean reasoning in all of physics. Starting from Weyl’s gauge argument,
Steiner provides a brief account of the considerations of local conservation of charge
in Weyl (1929) that provide the basic motivation for requiring local phase invariance.
This invariance is a localized𝑈 (1) symmetry from which the 4-vector potential, and
5 Renormalization techniques are mathematical methods introduced already in the context of
quantum electrodynamics more than a decade before Yang and Mills’s paper in order to deal with
infinities that arise and hinder the calculations in quantum field theories, and became a crucial part
of the quantum field theoretic program. See Cao (1999).
6 Gauge theories of gravity (see Hehl, 2017) aim to go beyond general relativity. The extent of the
mathematical analogy between electromagnetism and Newtonian gravity has also received recent
attention (Dewar, 2018; Teh, 2018).
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it’s law of transformation, are derived using his gauge argument.7 “The baffling
conclusion is: the move from global to local invariance in quantum mechanics is
equivalent to the existence of the classical electromagnetic field as described by
Maxwell” ((Steiner, 1998), p. 172).
In the construction of Yang-Mill theory, the analogy is based on the generalization
of the procedure from the 𝑈 (1) group of electromagnetism to other groups. Yang
and Mills considered the global continuous 𝑆𝑈 (2) symmetry of the isospin trans-
formation of a proton into a neutron and vice versa.8 Using a localization procedure
similar to Weyl’s, Yang and Mills were able to write down the analogs of Maxwell’s
equations for the new gauge field, which they identified with the nuclear force.
Framed in this manner, Steiner argues that the Pythagorean nature of the analogy
is far more salient in the Yang-Mills case. One reason has to do with the fact that
the Yang-Mills field, in contrast to the electromagnetic field, has no classical par-
allel. “[T]he electromagnetic field was a well-established empirical phenomenon,
detectable on the macroscopic level, prior to its so-called “quantization,” the “clas-
sical” gauge fields of the Yang-Mills program were hardly real objects.” In fact, they
“existed only to be quantized away, for they cannot be detected at all as classical
objects” (1998, p. 174-175). Second, he notes that the “symmetries in question are
abstract symmetries (as opposed, for example, to spacetime symmetries). The valid-
ity of the projection from the success of one instance of this rule to another is heavily
dependent upon the idea that we must categorize nature through the categories of
mathematics.
The empirically successful theories that constitute the standard model of particle
physics, Steiner contends, were therefore constructed on the basis of Pythagorean
reasoning, that implicitly assumes the conformity of nature to mathematical cate-
gories that originate in anthropocentric values.
3.3 Responses to Steiner’s Challenge
One possible line of response to Steiner is to argue that the aesthetic notions that
guide the development of mathematics and its application in theoretical physics are
not derived from human values, but rather from experience. Steven Weinberg (1994)
famously expressed this view:
A physicist who says that a theory is beautiful does not mean quite the same thing that would
be meant in saying that a particular painting or a piece of music or poetry is beautiful. It
is not merely a personal expression of aesthetic pleasure; it is much closer to what a horse
trainer means when he looks at a racehorse and says that it is a beautiful horse. The horse
trainer is of course expressing a personal opinion, but it is an opinion about an objective
fact: that, on the basis of judgments that the trainer could not easily put into words, this is
the kind of horse that wins races. (p. 133)
7 Roughly speaking, the unitary group 𝑈 (1) is the group of all possible phase transformations.
8 The special unitary group 𝑆𝑈 (2) is the group whose members describe all possible rotations in
isospin space.
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The racehorse trainer has been at the track for many years—has experienced many horses
winning or losing—and has come to associate, without being able to express it explicitly,
certain visual cues with the expectation of a winning horse. (p. 158)
Can such reasoning explain the analogy employed in the case of the gauge argu-
ment? Steiner’s answer is that it cannot. Even if one puts the theoretical physicist
in line with the horse-breeder, their analogical reasoning is different. Fast horses
are easily understood as natural kinds. In contrast, it does not make sense to trust
a Pythagorean analogy unless one presupposes that the natural kinds of science
are those of mathematics, a presupposition that is irreconcilable with naturalism in
Steiner’s view. Steiner further emphasizes that the mathematics used in many cases
(e.g. the fibre-bundle representation of gauge theories) was developed independently
by mathematicians based on considerations that had nothing to do with physics.9
A different strategy is to deny that the argument is in fact a Pythagorean analogy.
Bartha (2010) (Section 6.3) adopted this non-Pythagorean strategy with respect to
some of Steiner’s examples, including Maxwell’s derivation of the displacement
current and the construction of Schrödinger’s equation. However, the question of
where to draw the line between physics and mathematics in the case of gauge
symmetries, as we shall see below, is a much tougher nut to crack.
3.4 Is Gauge Mere Convention?
The challenge presented by the gauge principle to naturalist philosophy involves more
than the difficulty of accounting for the historical development of physics. The heart
of the matter is the concept of a gauge symmetry itself. This had become clear as the
philosophical interest in the gauge principle began to take off (Teller, 1997; Brown,
1999; Teller, 2000; Lyre, 2000; Redhead, 2002; Martin, 2003; Ben-Menahem, 2012).
To get a sense of the problem, we can return to Yang and Mills’s 1954 description
of a gauge freedom in terms of a local convention:
“The difference between a neutron and a proton is then a purely arbitrary process. As usually
conceived, however, this arbitrariness is subject to the following limitation: once one chooses
what to call a proton, what a neutron, at one space-time point, one is then not free to make
any choices at other space-time points. [...] In the present paper we wish to explore the
possibility of requiring all interactions to be invariant under independent rotations of the
isotopic spin at all spacetime points, so that the relative orientation of the isotopic spin at two
space-time points becomes a physically meaningless quantity” (p.192, emphasis added).
This passive view of a gauge transformation (as a change in the mathematical de-
scription of a physical system, as opposed to a change in the system itself) became
part of the standard view among physicists. It was also given a philosophical for-
mulation by Auyang (1995), in her book that presents quantum field theory in a
Kantian categorical framework. Many of the philosophical concerns regarding the
9 However, Bangu (2006) points out major contributions of anti-anthropocentric values to the
development of mathematics, arguing against Steiner’s anthropocentric view of mathematics.
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gauge principle can be traced to Teller’s [1997] review of Auyang’s book, which
identified this point as requiring further investigation:
The gauge argument in quantum field theories is often presented in terms of linguistic
conventions. Since only relative phase matters and absolute phase is arbitrary, it makes no
difference which phase we call ‘zero’. Thus a local phase transformation is seen as no more
than a local change in the conventions of what we call what. But then this fact about mere
conventions has dramatic repercussions in seeming to force the introduction of an otherwise
neglected physical field! (p. 516)
This puzzle about the relation between descriptive mathematical conventions
and novel physical phenomena, as was soon pointed out (Brown, 1999; Norton,
2003), seems to echo the debates concerning the role of general covariance ((i.e. the
requirement for invariance under arbitrary coordinate transformations) in general
relativity. Einstein (1916) has described this principle using the terminology of
conventional choice of representation of the actual phenomena in his famous point
coincidence argument:
“there is nothing for it but to regard all imaginable systems of co-ordinates, on principle, as
equally suitable for the description of nature. [...]
The introduction of a system of reference serves no other purpose than to facilitate the
description of the totality of such coincidences.”
The possibility to obtain physical knowledge through the principle of general covari-
ance was immediately disputed and remains controversial (Norton, 1993; Pooley,
2010), mainly due to the question of the physical content of the constraint on the
mathematical formulation.
It therefore seems that we are facing here not only a miraculous analogy, but
rather an analogy between two miracles: that of general covariance and that of gauge
invariance. Novel laws of interaction seem to pop out, in both cases, out of a merely
formal constraint on the mathematical representation of nature.
Steiner’s discussion of symmetries highlights a similar problem, describing sym-
metry arguments in particle physics as “doubly Pythagorean” (p. 84). Given that sym-
metries are understood in terms of similarity relations between structures, Steiner
notes that not only is this notion of a similarity purely mathematical, but the structures
from which the analogies set off are irreducible to any apparent physical properties.
Internal symmetries in particular are merely defined as groups of automorphisms of
the mathematical structure10; “The groups invoked in the theory of elementary par-
ticles today”, he stresses, “express symmetries only in this question-begging sense
[i.e. the sense of mathematical automorphism]; they do not express empirical or
geometrical symmetries. The analogies here were therefore, in fact, Pythagorean.”
(p. 94).
10 Automorphism is the mathematical concept that is also used to describe the replacement of one
convention with another. See for example Redhead (2002).
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4 Gauge: an Idealist Reading
In light of the manner in which the gauge argument tends to blur the distinction
between mathematical and physical reasoning, it may be natural to first consider a
Kantian response to Steiner’s Pythagoreanism, one which highlights, at the outset,
the mathematical constitution of scientific thought. Steiner (1998, p. 9) considered
such a response. He notes that on the
Kantian account of mathematical discovery: the world is the way it is, in part because of our
contribution to our own experiences. Mathematics is the lens through which we view the
Universe, meaning the phenomenal, or experienced, Universe (about things in themselves
we know nothing). This is also a valid attempt to explain away [this appeal to Pythagorean
analogies], but it will have to come to grips with the nature of contemporary science, which
deals with objects beyond the realm of spatiotemporal experience.
Here, we will briefly consider not only whether it is possible to defend a Kantian
perspective on the analogies underwriting the gauge argument, but also the extent
to which such an account actually served as an early justification for Weyl’s gauge
theory.
4.1 A Little Historical Context
In the early twentieth century, philosophers of science in the Kantian tradition were
faced with the problem of articulating a new epistemology of science in light of
recent developments in both the foundations of mathematics and physics. Hilbert’s
formalist program in the foundations of mathematics had made it clear that the
Kantian epistemological program was in need of a novel reformulation, as Kant’s
account of the synthetic nature of mathematical thought was no longer tenable. Kant
held that mathematical concepts are founded upon an act of construction in intuition
(the faculty through which they are exhibited). On Kant’s account, it is only by way of
our ‘pure’ intuitions of time and space, that arithmetic and geometry can be formally
constructed. However, both the logicist (e.g. Fregean) and formalist (e.g. Hilbertian)
programs in the foundations of mathematics had made it clear that mathematical
concepts need not be exhibited in intuition to be definable.
Furthermore, Einstein’s work on the development of the theories of special and
general relativity seemed to present a profound challenge to the Kantian account of
the constitutive framework of physical enquiry. Kant held that a fixed Euclidean spa-
tial and temporal structure (along with a set of fundamental conceptual categories),
define the constitutive framework of scientific thought. He argued that this frame-
work serves as a necessary presupposition of scientific cognition, in the sense that it
makes the scientific understanding of nature possible. However, Kant’s thought was
couched in the Newtonian worldview, which was no longer taken to provide a viable
foundation for scientific thought (at least from the perspective of early twentieth
century physics). The development of the theories of special and general relativity
had shown that the privileged a priori status that Kant assigned to Euclidean spatial
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geometry was no longer justified. In addition, given the interweaving of geomet-
rical and dynamical structure in the theory of general relativity, it was no longer
clear if one could even defend a traditional Kantian account of the constitutive ge-
ometrical framework of scientific thought. Yet, the question remained whether the
Kantian epistemological program could be suitably reinterpreted in light of these
developments in the foundations of mathematics and physics.11
By the 1920s, these difficulties gave rise to two strands of philosophical thought
that sought to develop a novel understanding of the epistemology of modern math-
ematical physics. These were the ‘early’ logical positivist and neo-Kantian tradi-
tions.12 In a certain sense, both of these traditions looked to reinterpret the Kantian
program in light of the recent developments in the foundations of mathematics and
physics—highlighting both the formalist tradition in the philosophy of mathematics
and the epistemological lessons gained from the general theory of relativity (for
more, see Friedman (1999); and Ryckman (2005)). In this pursuit, they were forced
to abandon the traditional Kantian account of the synthetic a priori.13 But without
the anchor of Kant’s account of the necessary and universal a priori forms of intu-
ition, the worry seemed to be that the Kantian epistemological program may be set
adrift in the sea of relativism. Thus, the debate hinged on how to best understand the
formal systems of physical enquiry in this new light.
Weyl’s philosophy of science offered a deep and thoughtful analysis of the nature
of modern scientific thought, and directly engaged with foundational issues in both
the logical positivist and neo-Kantian traditions (e.g. see Weyl (1949)). Weyl, better
than anyone else, understood the fundamental implications of the interweaving of
geometry and dynamics in the dynamical spacetime structure of general relativity,
and the blurring of mathematics and physics that it seemed to entail. This was partic-
ularly important to Weyl in light of the pioneering work of Klein’s Erlanger program
on the group-theoretic foundations of geometry. Weyl’s broadly idealist philosophy
was motivated by the desire to better understand the rich interplay between math-
ematics and physics, in the context of group theory, and on this basis, to present a
unified mathematical-physical philosophy of nature.
11 Here, and in the paragraph above, we would like to acknowledge that the presented characterization
of Kant’s thought is neither universally accepted nor unambiguous. The aim is to merely give a
sense of some of the central concerns that guided the relevant philosophical discussion in the early
twentieth century.
12 The former associated with Schlick, Reichenbach, and Carnap, and the latter, most notably, with
Cassirer.
13 For example, Cassirer (1910/1923) offered a regulative reading of the relativised constitutive
principles of physical enquiry. Reichenbach [1920/1965] offered a similar account of the coordi-
native principles of scientific thought. However, in later years, this was reinterpreted in line with
Schlick’s particular reading of Poincare’s conventionalism (see Friedman (1999); Ben-Menahem
(2006)).
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4.2 Weyl’s Philosophy of Science and the Gauge Argument
In 1927 (with a major revision in 1949), Weyl reflected on the foundations of gauge
theory in a text entitled Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science. Here,
he puts forth a broadly Kantian account of scientific enquiry.14 Concerning the
applicability of mathematics in physics, the fundamental problem as Weyl (1949,
p. 123) saw it was that “the mere positing of the external world does not really
explain what it was meant to explain, the question of the reality of the world mingles
inseparably with the question of the reason for its lawful mathematical harmony.”15
In line with traditional neo-Kantian critiques of the applicability of mathematics
in science (e.g. Cassirer (1910/1923)), Weyl (1949, p. 113) held that the ‘reality’
depicted in modern physics is “ultimately a symbolic construction”. However, he
(1949, p. 116) points out that within the “natural sciences the conflicting philosophies
of idealism and realism signify principles of method which do not contradict each
other”. On the one hand, we
construct through science an objective world in which all perceptions are founded on ob-
jective facts in “reality”. Here natural science proceeds realistically. [...] On the other hand
science concedes to idealism that its objective reality is not given but to be constructed,
and that it cannot be constructed absolutely but only in relation to an arbitrarily assumed
coordinate system and in mere symbols [i.e. to a given symbolic representation]. (Weyl,
1949, p. 117).
Weyl then turns to a discussion of the nature of this theoretical construction.
Reflecting on the conformal geometry underlying his gauge theory of 1918, Weyl
was able to draw an important lesson concerning what he took to be the nature
of the Kantian program in modern physics. Following Kant, he held the symbolic
construction of nature can only be defined on the “field of the a priori existing
possibilities” (Weyl, 1949, p. 131). However, Weyl notes that the ‘a priori field of
possibilities’ is far more general than previously thought. In a general dynamical
spacetime theory, the metrical structure is not given a priori as it was for Kant.
The material content determines the local metrical structure of any given spacetime
region, a postriori. It is only the Pythagorean-Riemannian form of the metric which
is given a priori. Thus, the Kantian line between the a priori and a posteriori has
shifted, as only the form of the local metrical structure is predetermined (Weyl, 1949,
p. 134-137).
In the transition to Weyl’s 1929 gauge theory, the physical setting may have
changed, but certain key aspects of his methodological approach remained the same.
By the mid-1920s, Weyl had given up the hope of a geometrical unification of the
fundamental forces of nature, in line with what one might call a more traditional
form of neo-Kantian idealism. He had already seen that such a unification would
14 However, it is important to note that Weyl’s philosophy was not purely idealistic (Scholz, 2004),
but it seems much of his philosophical thought was motivated by both the Kantian and Husserlian
traditions (e.g. see Ryckman (2005)).
15 In this case, the positing of an external world was meant to explain the objective nature of
scientific knowledge.
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not be possible in the context of the new quantum theory of matter. However,
when reflecting on this transition, Weyl maintained the methodological commitment
to a broadly Kantian account of the constitutive framework of scientific enquiry.
Weyl still sought to ground the theoretical construction of reality on a ‘a priori
field of possibilities”, but this field was now defined in terms of a more general
symmetry structure underlying physical theory. In the process, one could argue that
the constitutive framework had shifted once again. This time to an even more abstract
level, based on a group-theoretic account of objectivity.
In Weyl’s appeal to a group-theoretic account of objectivity, we can discern the
outlines of what we might call a Weylian form of neo-Kantian idealism. Reflecting
on the structure of mathematics and physics, Weyl held that the relevant notion of
objectivity is the same in both cases. A relation can only be determined to be objective
if it remains invariant under a given set of transformations. However, drawing on
Klein’s Erlanger Program, Weyl (1949, p. 73) notes that to define invariance one
presupposes a group operation, as “only once a group is given [do] we know what
like-ness or similarity means”. It is in this sense that Weyl held that there was
a close harmony between the notions of mathematical and physical symmetry. In
mathematics, any group can be taken to define the symmetries which characterize
the objective features of an associated structure. Thus, the domain of possible groups
demarcates the domain of possible structures, up to an isomorphism. On Weyl’s view,
the same is true in physics. In physics, one characterizes the objective symmetries of
a physical structure through the group operations that define its invariance structure.
In fact, Weyl held that physical symmetries are formally a subset of a broader class
of mathematical symmetries. In this sense, the generalization, or rather extension, of
the mathematical symmetries of a physical theory would correspond to a potential
extension of its physical symmetries. The extension would serve to ground a new
‘field of a priori existing possibilities’. Indeed, this is how one might read Weyl’s
(1952) famous dictum that all a priori statements have their origin in symmetry.
However, to simply point out that a symmetry structure serves in a certain sense
as a precondition of scientific objectivity is not to say much at all if any symmetry
group could serve as an equally valid basis for the theoretical construction of ‘real-
ity’. Certainly, in mathematics, one is free to choose whatever group one wishes. But
in physics, the freedom one has in specifying the relevant symmetry structure under-
lying physical theory is greatly constrained. Weyl stressed that our physical theories
must be confronted with nature as a whole (1949, p. 61). This confrontation with
nature ‘as a whole’, concerns the harmony, or “concordance” (p. 62), that a given
theoretical construction brings to our understanding of nature, and not all extensions
of the basic group structures of modern physics will lead to novel physical insight
(e.g. see Scholz (2018)). Thus, on Weyl’s view, physics is in a continual process of
development, searching the domain of structural extensions for those that lead to a
more encompassing picture of ‘reality’. Throughout this process, one finds funda-
mental group structures that persist, and these structures serve to guide scientific
thought.
Certainly, more work remains to clarify the nature of the constitutive framework
of this Weylian view, but one can already make out its broader methodological
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implications. If we can only understand nature through a given symmetry structure,
then it is no miracle that we find such structures throughout modern physical theory.
In addition, if the development of science entails, at least in part, a generalization of
the underlying local group structures of a physical theory, then it would not come as a
surprise that this trend continued with Yang-Mills theory through to the development
of the standard model of particle physics.
4.3 Weylian Idealism, Analogies, and the Gauge Argument
On this reading of Weyl’s idealist philosophy, the appeal to analogy serves to extend
the domain of the symmetries underwriting the constitutive framework of scientific
thought. This is by showing that the extension, or generalization, of the mathematical
framework of a physical theory could correspond to a potential extension of its
physical domain of application. In a certain sense, one could argue that Weyl’s
gauge methodology was based on a principle of analogy—it is only by way of
analogy that Weyl could ensure that the right constructive concepts evolve for the
account of nature. The ‘gauge principle’ merely expresses an essential feature of this
methodology, as the appeal to formal analogies served to secure a methodological
continuity. Indeed, this could be seen as the reason why Weyl sought in 1929 to
connect his later work on gauge theory with its early foundation in general relativity.
The analogies in the development of gauge theory may have been more about guiding
the symbolic construction of reality than about specific physical analogies between
gravity and electromagnetism. The analogies underwriting the gauge principle serve
to constrain the mathematical formalism for the symbolic construction of nature, by
showing that diverse phenomena can be understood in terms of the same structure—
thus, bringing them into harmony with one another.
Weyl’s philosophy of science served to both motivate the development of the
gauge argument and justify its application in the context of a broader ‘mathemat-
ical methodology’ of physical inquiry. Here we can discern an interesting idealist
response to Steiner’s anthropocentric Pythagoreanism. In the historical development
of science, following Weyl, we might argue that we obtain a better understanding
when we can show that diverse phenomena can be characterized through the same
basic structural relations. In drawing an analogy between different domains, we do
not highlight a similarity, but construct it.
In picking up the gauge argument, whereby the fundamental interactions in nature
are derived from the postulated gauge invariance, we could argue that Yang and Mills
(1954) implicitly assumed the norms of the methodology that supported it. In fact,
writing in 1989, Mills reflects on the methodological principles underwriting the
gauge argument. He notes that what underlies the gauge argument is the growing re-
alization “of the importance of symmetry to our basic understanding of the universe,
to the point where it is now felt that it is the underlying symmetry of physical laws
that drives the system—that determines the structure of the laws and the number and
character of elementary particles” (p. 494).
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This methodology was grounded on an appeal to Noether’s theorem(s), which
Mills paraphrases as “for every symmetry of nature there is a corresponding conser-
vation law and for every conservation law there is a symmetry” (Mills, 1989, p. 494).
In the context of a discussion of conservation laws, he notes that it is “quite possible
that Noether’s theorem is the more fundamental fact—that the physical theories that
we devise to describe the universe about us have the structure they do because of this
fundamental relationship between symmetries and conservation laws.” In this case,
Noether’s theorem becomes a principle through which theories are constructed, “like
the principles of equivalence in special and general relativity; we should say than
that classical physical laws take the Lagrangian form and quantum theory takes its
characteristic Hamiltonian form as a consequence of Noether’s principle” (p. 494).
Mills elevates, by way of analogy, a mathematical theorem to a physical principle!
Following Steiner, this reasoning could be understood as an explicit avowal
of Pythagoreanism. On the Pythagorean view, the symmetry-dictates-interaction
paradigm is simply reified into a principle of nature. From a naturalist perspective,
it thus became miraculous. Steiner may be right on this point. However, the real
problem may be that within gauge theory, the line between the physical and the
mathematical has become inextricably blurred. Thus, the most natural justification
of modern appeals to the gauge argument may lie in the idealist tradition that first
motivated its development.
The idealist’s disagreement with Steiner primarily concerns the nature of scientific
thought. Steiner holds that such thought relates directly to the natural world. In this
case, the anthropocentrism implicit in the Pythagorean analogies of modern science
tends, given their miraculous success, to indicate that the world must be in some
sense ‘user-friendly’. The idealist finds no miracle in this, as the ‘natural world’ is
only given according to the constitutive framework of scientific thought. Thus, it
is by definition ‘user-friendly’. However, both would agree that the ‘Pythagorean
analogies’ one finds in modern science pose a distinct challenge to Naturalism.
5 Gauge: a Naturalist Account
The term naturalism relates to a range of epistemic and ontological approaches that
give central place to scientific standards and methods of inquiry and to scientific
knowledge. Steiner contrasts naturalism with anthropocentrism. The aspect of nat-
uralism that is the focus of Steiner’s critic in the Applicability is the belief that
the human perspective should not be a privileged one. While it may appear clear
to some that scientific standards allow no place for the anthropocentric values, the
anti-anthropocentric aspect of naturalism is seldom an explicit part of presented self-
proclaimed naturalist views. One such view which does make it explicit is subject
naturalism advocated by Huw Price (2011), presented as “the philosophical view-
point that begins with the realization that we humans (our thought and talk included)
are surely part of the natural world” (p. 5). Steiner’s argument seems to imply that
this view is undermined by the observation that human values are the driving force
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that gives rise to major scientific discoveries. Steiner problem may be stated as the
observation that while the content of our scientific theories is in harmony with this
form of naturalism, scientific methods of discovery are not. This conflict between
the discovery and content of theories leads Steiner to doubt whether “it is profitable
to construct a philosophy based both on what scientists say and what they do” (p.
10).
This section does not intend to provide a general answer to these questions, but
rather to focus on the example of the gauge methodology and outline a naturalist
way of understanding it. It is a naturalist approach in two respects. First, it sets
off from the invariance requirement, understood as a naturalist desideratum that
concerns the indifference of the represented physical phenomena to its theoretical
mode of representation (it is therefore a stronger version of naturalism than Price’s
aforementioned version, which aims to present a naturalist philosophy disengaged
from representationalist intentions). Second, this approach attributes the success of
certain symmetry considerations to a contingent property of the natural world. In
contrast to the approach presented in Section 4 as well as to Steiner’s approach,
here the reconstruction of the methodology is only the starting point. The focus thus
shifts from the method (together with the values and ideas that motivated it) to the
conjectured physical basis for its success.
Let us begin with the notion of invariance that is sometimes used interchangeably
with that of symmetry. An invariance requirement amounts to the demand that
we formulate laws in a manner such that their form remains intact under certain
transformations. Some invariance requirements, including those which are at the
basis of the gauge argument, can be regarded, at their core, as a naturalist desiderata.
The scientific aim to formulate laws of nature in an invariant form is an expression
of the belief that nature does not care about our particular choice of representation.
Einstein expressed such a view when he described the reasoning that led him to the
general theory of relativity (Einstein, 1919, 1954a). Similar reasoning is sometimes
used in contemporary expositions of gauge theories. Nakahara (2003), for example,
emphasizes the similarity between gauge symmetry and general covariance when he
presents the gauge principle as stating that “physics should not depend on how we
describe it”.
This view, however, raises more questions than it answers. It is obviously dubious,
particularly from a naturalist point of view, to trust such a philosophical desideratum
as a guide to new knowledge. Moreover, it is unclear to what degree this kind of
reasoning played an actual role in the historical development of gauge theories. Nev-
ertheless, this view forms a central motivation for a recent conceptual reconstruction
of the gauge argument (Hetzroni, 2021). The principles employed in this account are
plainly analogous to Einstein’s reasoning in presenting general relativity (Hetzroni,
2020). In this approach, the invariance requirement is supported by a ‘relationist’
view of gauge, according to which the fundamental physical quantities are relations
between different entities. The aim is naturalist: to explain the success of the formal-
ism by appealing to contingent physical properties (in this case, relational quantities).
Here, however, we shall aim at a sharper separation between the suggested method
and its interpretation. We begin below by presenting the methodology, as a recon-
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struction of the gauge argument, that sets off from the invariance requirement but
includes an additional element, the methodological equivalence principle. We leave
the discussion of the naturalist interpretation to Section 5.3, in which we outline
a reconstruction of the analogy between gravity, electromagnetism and Yang-Mills
theory as a material analogy. Section 5.4 discusses the extent to which this account
can be considered a response to Steiner’s problem.
5.1 The Methodological Equivalence Principle
A general lesson from the debates described in Section 3.4 over the role of general
covariance in general relativity and the gauge argument in particle physics is that it is
not possible to understand the conceptual relation between symmetries and interac-
tions based on the invariance requirement by itself. The methodological equivalence
principle aims to capture the additional element in the methodology.
The fundamental observation is that while invariance is a formal constraint, it is
pursued in many different cases according to a specific prescription that rests on the
non-invariance of an existing theory. The non-invariance of a theory, by definition,
involves a preferred class of representations in which the dynamical laws take a
simple form, and additional or modified terms that appear under a transformation
(for example, inertial frames in special relativity are preferred ways of assigning
coordinates to spacetime points, such that the laws of motion take a particularly
simple form). The prescription that allows physicists to guess the laws of interaction
is based on the exact form of these additional terms. More formally, the principle
states:
The Methodological Equivalence Principle: Given a non-invariant dynamical law, in the
sense that that it obtains a simple form in some preferred representations while in arbitrary
representations it includes modified/additional expressions, construct an invariant law by
replacing the modified/additional expressions with new dynamical fields, whose set of
possible local values is identical to that of the modified/additional expressions, and obey the
same transformation rules.
This principle aims to convert Einstein’s equivalence principle into a general
method suitable for modern field theories, in which the equivalence is not an empir-
ical fact known in advance, but is rather conjectured.
For example, in quantum mechanics the Schrödinger equation describing the tem-








changes its form under a local change of the phase convention: |𝑥〉 → 𝑒𝑖Λ(𝑥) |𝑥〉
into the form 𝑖ℏ 𝜕
𝜕𝑡








𝜓 (with 𝜔𝑖 = 𝜕Λ𝜕𝑥𝑖 ). This change does
not seem to reflect anything physical; it is obtained by pure mathematics from the
change of local convention in which the basis states are re-defined. The Schrödinger
equation corresponding to the situation in which the particle is subjected to classical
(static) magnetic influence can be obtained using the methodological equivalence
principle by formally replacing 𝜔𝑖 with the components of a gauge field identified
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with the magnetic vector potential. Similarly, the Dirac equation
𝑖𝛾`𝜕`𝜓 − 𝑚𝜓 = 0 (1)
is not invariant under change of local phase convention in spacetime: 𝜓 → 𝑒𝑖Λ(𝑥)𝜓





𝜓 − 𝑚𝜓 = 0. (2)
The methodological equivalence principle urges us to replace the term that breaks
the invariance 𝜕`Λ with a physical field 𝐴` (accompanied by a coupling constant 𝑒
corresponding to the charge of the particle).16 This change would indeed lead to the





𝜓 − 𝑚𝜓 = 0. (3)
In the case of several spinor fields with equal mass parameter, the introduction of the
Yang-Mills field using the requirement for invariance under local change in isospin
convention is completely analogous.
The same method can be used as the basis of gravitational coupling prescriptions
in a wide range of physical situations using the requirement for general covariance
(see Hetzroni and Read (2021) for details and a discussion on the relation of the
principle to standard formulations of Einstein’s equivalence principle). Setting off
from a free particle described according to the special theory of relativity, the
trajectory of the particle 𝑥` (𝜏) satisfies the equation 𝑑2𝑥`
𝑑𝜏2
= 0 (expressing the
relativistic Newtonian law of motion with 𝜏 the proper time). The equation is not
generally covariant due to the transformation of the derivative under coordinate























and obeys the usual transformation law for Christoffel symbols. The methodological
equivalence principle motivates and prescribes the formulation of an invariant law
by postulating the existence of an interaction, such that the local form of the equation
of motion is:
16 Note that according to the methodological equivalence principle the possible local values (at a
point) of the new term 𝑒𝐴` are the possible local values of the term 𝜕`Λ, yet, the space of possible
functions 𝑒𝐴` is bigger than that of 𝜕`Λ, as the latter is constrained to be irrotational vector fields.
17 The introduction of the Maxwellian term − 14𝐹
`a𝐹`a into the Lagrangian would require addi-
tional principles. Here we limit our attention to the interaction terms in the equations of motion.










The Christoffel symbol in this equation is understood to represent the influence of
a gravitational-like interaction. It can be interpreted geometrically as a symmetric
affine connection over a linearly connected space. The pseudo-Riemannian geome-
try of the general theory of relativity in which (6) is the familiar geodesic equation
is a special case (the case of Weyl geometry with scale symmetry of the metric is
another special case). A metric-like tensor 𝑔`a and the corresponding (Riemannian)
Levi-Civita connection can be obtained by applying the same method to the rela-






𝛼𝑢𝛽 and deriving the new
equations of motion.18
The methodological equivalence principle therefore extends the physical scope
as well as the empirical content of a theory by introducing new fields. The initial
non-invariance of the dynamics under a transformation understood as a change in
the mathematical convention not only motivates this change, but also specifies its
form. Gravity, electromagnetism and Yang-Mills theories are fully analogous in this
respect.
5.2 A Formalist Analogy?
The presentation of the gauge argument in terms of the methodological equivalence
principle emphasizes the role of mathematical conventions in the argument. It does
not by itself resolve any of the epistemological worries about gauge; actually it seems
to make things worse. The different mathematical descriptions of the motion of a free
particle in flat spacetime appear to be mysteriously connected to the contingent way
in which a particular physical interaction, gravitation, would alter the trajectory of a
particle. The different possible phase conventions through which an interaction-free
quantum field can be described seem to give us a broad hint about the way this field
would interact with an electromagnetic field. Different local isospin conventions,
through which non-interacting fermion fields can be described, appear to correspond,
for some reason, to different possible settings of an additional Yang-Mills field that
is associated with a new interaction.
All this should sound deeply troubling. In all those cases, the purely mathematical
relations between different conventions associated with a given system reveal some
contingent facts about the possible interaction of the system with an external field,
through reasoning that lead to successful and accurate predictions.
Recall that invariance has been presented above as a naturalist desideratum.
Indeed, it makes sense to ask “what has nature to do with our coordinate sys-
tems\phase conventions\isospin conventions? If it is necessary for the purpose of
18 It is quite a general result, which also holds in field theories, that the results of applying the
methodological equivalence principle for arbitrary coordinate transformations at the level of the
Lagrangian coincide with those obtained by the coupling prescription of general relativity (Hetzroni
and Read, 2021).
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describing nature, to write our equations in a particular coordinate system\phase
convention\isospin convention arbitrarily introduced by us, then its choice ought to
be subject to no restriction”.19 But, as we have seen, by adhering to this principle
the naturalist might be shooting herself in the foot: the statement expresses a formal
and a priori requirement that seems to involve the form of the theory rather than it’s
physical content.
The introduction of the interaction, however, involves more than manipulating
the different conventions, as has been pointed out (Brown, 1999; Martin, 2003); it
requires a non-trivial generalization in order to turn a flat connection into a curved
one, and other considerations in order to construct the interaction and the dynamics
of the free field. The mathematical conventions don’t know everything about the
previously unknown interaction, yet the method presented in the previous section
can easily leave one with the feeling that they know too much!
While it is impossible to know what Steiner’s opinion on this presentation of the
gauge argument would have been, we can point out that his philosophical analysis can
provide a deeper perspective on this issue, suggesting that the methodological equiv-
alence principle is, by itself, a mathematical analogy. In addition to the ‘horizontal’
analogies between gravity and electromagnetism, or between electromagnetism and
the nuclear interactions, this is a ‘vertical’ analogy. The mathematical analogy here
bridges the system that is described by the interaction-free theory and the greater,
extended, system that is described by the theory of interaction. More precisely, the
analogy conjectures a mathematical similarity between the initially known mathe-
matical representations of the original system, and possible configurations of the
gauge field that governs the introduced interaction.
Steiner described the gauge argument as a Pythagorean analogy, i.e. an analogy
between physically distinct interactions that have nothing in common except for the
conjectured similarity in the mathematical form of their descriptions. The vertical
analogy seems even more troubling in the way it crosses the border between physics
and mathematics. Steiner, in a different context, described such analogies as formalist
analogies:
“In some remarkable instances, mathematical notation (rather than structures) provided the
analogies used in physical discovery. [...] So the analogy was to the form of an equation, not
to its mathematical meaning. This is a special case of Pythagorean analogies which I will
call ‘formalist’ analogies.” (p. 4)
“I single out formalist analogies because, from the ‘naturalist’ standpoint, formalist analogies
are (or should be) particularly repugnant.” (p.54)
According to the approach defended in Applicability, the mathematical language
is shaped by anthropocentric values such as convenience and beauty. Accordingly,
the practice of using the different mathematical representations of a physical system
to guess its law of interaction with other systems makes no sense from the naturalist’s
point of view. Therefore, understanding the gauge argument in terms of the method-
ological equivalence principle turns out to highlight an additional way in which the
19 Paraphrasing Einstein (1919), p. 230.
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empirical success of the gauge argument indicates the user-friendly nature of the
world, undermining naturalist philosophy.
5.3 Relational Quantities and Material Analogies
We began this section by arguing that the naturalist is well motivated to pursue
theories whose laws are invariant under change of representation. Yet, the way this
invariance is pursued is through a formalist analogy whose recurring success appears
miraculous by the naturalist own standards. The situation, however, is not hopeless.
A mathematical analogy can make sense from a naturalist point of view if the
formal similarity on which it is based is seen as associated with an actual physical
similarity. Note that the question regarding the exact nature of the physical similarity
arises only for those analogies that have already been shown to lead to empirically
successful theories. The aim to learn from the success of a given guess may involve
considerations that are different from the actual lines of reasoning used by physicists
who initially made the guess.
Norton [2020, chp. 4] presented a minimalist “material” account of analogy which
centres on the factual basis of the analogy. In this section, we will appeal to Norton’s
account to defend a naturalist understanding of the gauge argument (gravitational
coupling in general relativity included) through the lens of the methodological
equivalence principle.
According to Norton’s analysis, a material analogy is based on a fact of analogy,
i.e. “a factual state of affairs that arises when two systems’ properties are similar,
with the exact mode of correspondence expressed as part of the fact.” Norton stresses
that “[t]here is no general template to which the fact must conform”. In particular,
it could either be an empirical fact, subjected to direct observation, or a fact that is
merely conjectured. In many cases, this fact is a property shared by the two systems.
A second essential element is analogical inference “warranted by a fact of analogy”.
In our case we are looking for a physical property that is common to the grav-
itational, electromagnetic and nuclear interactions, that can justify the analogical
inferences that give rise to the laws of interaction through the gauge principle.
Rovelli (2014) is concerned with a closely related question: why is the world
described so well by gauge theories? Rovelli notes that many physical systems can
be described either using gauge independent variables (e.g. electromagnetic fields)
or gauge dependent variables (such as the electromagnetic potentials). However,
the description of the interaction of the system with other systems (e.g. coupling
of electromagnetism to matter fields) involves gauge dependent variables of both
systems, that together form new gauge independent quantities. For example, the
gauge dependent local phase gradient of a fermion quantum field couples to the
electromagnetic potential to form the covariant derivative operator that describes the
coupling of the particle to electromagnetism. Without the coupling, it might seem
like the gauge independent variables of the two systems provide a full description,
but the presence of an interaction reveals that this is not the case. The new gauge
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independent variable formed using gauge dependent variables of the two systems
is interpreted as a quantity that represents a relation between the two systems, on
which the interaction depends. Rovelli therefore suggests that gauge invariance is an
indication of an ontological property: the relational nature of fundamental physical
quantities, that “do not refer to properties of a single entity. They refer to relational
properties between entities”.
Hetzroni (2021, 2020) has more recently showed that this observation can be
used to understand the working of the gauge argument. According to this account,
the invariance requirement reflects the relationist desideratum that “the laws of
physics should depend on the relations between fundamental physical objects, and
not on the relations of the physical objects to a fictitious mathematical frame of
reference” [2020, p. 130].
In order to use this desideratum to present gauge as a material analogy, let
us first note that the formal similarity is already manifest in the interaction-free
theories. The laws of motion in special relativity and the Dirac equation of the free
field both define a class of preferred mathematical representations: Lorentz frames
in the former case, and the Schrödinger representation (in which the momentum
operator is proportional to the derivative operator) in the latter. In those preferred
representations, the equations of motion take a unique simple form. The choice
of mathematical convention does make a difference, in contrast to the invariance
requirement.
We know from experience that it is possible to find certain domains in spacetime
in which special relativity is empirically adequate. The motions of material bodies
(and the dynamics of matter fields) in such a domain take a unique form in certain
coordinate systems connected to each other by Lorentz transformations. General
relativity, however, tells us that these preferred coordinate systems are actually a
local manifestation of the gravitational field. In other words, the equations of motion
of special relativity that appear to describe the motion of bodies with respect to
Lorentz frames, actually describe the motion of bodies with respect to the local
gravitational field.
The analogical reasoning in this case conjectures that, in the case of the quantum
spinor field, the preferred Schrödinger representation in a given region is a manifes-
tation of an additional field, that, similarly, is not taken into account in the original
theory. The fact of analogy in this case is thus the existence of the additional field.
Next thing to ask is how does the fact of analogy warrant the analogical inference.
Recall that according to the relationist view of gauge, the aim of the gauge heuristics
is to construct a variable that represents the relation between the original system
and the introduced gauge field. Again, the crucial point here is that the preferred
representation in the interaction-free theory is a manifestation of a special case of
an interaction: the possible values of 𝛾`
𝛼𝛽
in Eq. (4) are no more than different
representations of the uniform field. The construction of Eq. (6) from Eq. (4) can be
seen as consisting of two distinct elements. The first, which concerns the notation and
its interpretation, is interpreting the coefficients Γ`
𝛼𝛽
as a field that acts in the settings
described by the original coordinates 𝑥`, rather than a manifestation of a coordinate
transformation. The postulate that can warrant this step is that the range of different
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representations of a given uniform field correspond to the range of possible uniform
fields that can act at a point. In other words, the assumption is that the mathematical
representation of the space of physical possibilities is an adequate one. The second
element is the generalization from a uniform field to a non-uniform field, i.e. to a
general Γ`
𝛼𝛽
that does not obey the constraint of Eq. (5). It is this element that makes
the introduction of the new field physically meaningful, achieving more than formal
invariance. The uniform field settings, in which special relativity is applicable, is
therefore conceived here as a subspace of a more general space of possibilities. The
local relational variables that describe the settings of the gravitational field with
respect to the material content are generalized from those that describe the special
uniform field. Again, the assumption that can warrant this generalization is that the
mathematical structure corresponds to the space of physical possibilities, this time
the space in question is this of the new gravitational theory.
In order for the analogical inference to the electromagnetic case to be warranted
by the conjectured existence of the gauge field, similar conditions should hold.
Primarily, the free Dirac equation has to be understood as describing not merely the
limit in which the strength of the interaction is zero, but rather a special case of an
interaction. The analogy does not have to be simple and straightforward; in this case
we are obviously not talking about uniform electric or magnetic field. There is indeed
a famous situation that demonstrates that equation (1) is valid in a certain domain
that is influenced by the electromagnetic interaction: the Aharonov-Bohm effect.
In this case, the electromagnetic interaction changes the phase relation between
two domains, even though each of them separately is described by the free Dirac
equation (1). Thus, the transition from Eq. (2) to the theory of interaction described
by (3) can be similarly understood in the same basis. Eq. (3) with the constraint
𝜕`𝐴a − 𝜕a𝐴` = 0 describes a gauge field whose possible local states correspond to
the different representation of the situation described by the interaction-free theory.
Relaxing this condition generalizes the space of local possible relations between
the fermion field and the gauge field. Similarly, in Yang-Mills theory the preferred
local isospin convention motivates the conjecture of the existence of the Yang-Mills
field. The relation between the preferred convention to other, general local isospin
conventions, corresponds to possible relations between the state of the fermion field
and the new field 𝐵`.
5.4 A Response to Steiner Challenge?
The idea that gauge symmetries express the relational nature of physical quantities is a
new idea. If this idea is correct, it means that physicists who developed gauge theories
somehow managed to suggest successful theories, but for the wrong reasons. Surely,
this would not be the first instance of physicists formulating successful theories
based on considerations or concepts that are later abandoned or replaced by other
justifications. Indeed, this might be the situation in the case of Yang and Mills’s
theory. According to ’t Hooft (2005, pp 1-2), in contrast to Yang and Mills’s locality
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desideratum (see Section 3.1), it is actually “easy enough to write down equations
for perfectly localized fields that show only global, continuous symmetries such
as isospin”. ’t Hooft further states that “As often happens with obviously false
statements, they were eagerly embraced by some enthusiastic followers; yet this
cannot be the real reason why the theory became as important as it is today. [...]
And so it happened that, by asking a rather ill-posed question, Yang and Mills made
a momentous discovery: electro-magnetism and gravity are not the only force laws
one can write down that have a local symmetry”.
However, even if one accepts the claim that the reason for the success of the
gauge methodology is the significance of relational quantities, to what extent would
it constitute an answer to Steiner’s challenge? Even if the naturalist would find ex
post facto a physical similarity at the basis of each and every mathematical analogy
that contributed to our successful theories, would it make the world appear less “user
friendly”? After all, Steiner’s claim for anthropocentricity is based upon the very
possibility of discovering the laws through mathematical analogies.
The account presented above, however, provides another perspective on the appli-
cability of mathematics in physics, by emphasizing the methodological significance
of the conjectured relation of representation between certain mathematical concepts
and physical objects. Namely, the physicists who used the gauge argument to make
guesses were not completely misguided: they were correct in regarding the states
connected by gauge transformations as representing the same state of affairs. This
amounts to rejecting the anthropocentric view of mathematics (at least when it comes
to the mathematics relevant in the physical context), and regard the development of
the mathematical representation of the world in physics as an outcome of a grad-
ual process of scientific inquiry through trial and error. Indeed, the development of
physics provides numerous examples of mathematical analogies that lead to failed
theories. In our context it seems relevant to note the gravitational theory of Barbour
and Bertotti (1977), which was constructed using an invariance requirement mani-
festly analogous to the one at the basis of the gauge argument, but led to empirically
inadequate predictions. Particle physics itself may (controversially) provide another
example, in the recent failures to detect Supersymmetry (whose analogy with the
case of gauge was explicitly noted, for example, in Yang, 1980). Such cases highlight
the significance of retrospective understanding of the applicability of mathematics.
The physicist who is trying to guess a previously unknown law is facing a completely
different challenge from the one who is trying to understand why a particular guess
led to an empirically successful theory while other ones have failed.
Thus, in the course of the scientific inquiry, we update on the one hand the way
nature is represented in our theories according to laws that proved to be empirically
adequate. On the other hand, in order to extend the laws and try to replace them with
more general ones, scientists regard certain mathematical concepts as a representa-
tion of reality. Applying invariance requirements is a manifestation of this reasoning,
reflecting Wigner’s [1967, p. 962] desideratum that “two different descriptions of
the same situation should develop, in the course of time, into two descriptions which
also describe the same physical situation”. Which distinct mathematical representa-
tions should be regraded as a description of one reality is of course a matter of one’s
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ontological picture. The naturalist’s ontological picture is shaped by the progress of
science and reflects the empirical knowledge available.
6 Taking Stock
Steiner’s anthropocentric Pythagoreanism non-trivially combines two different as-
sertions: that the human perspective on the universe is a privileged one, and that
physics can be reduced to mathematics (or at least that some of its natural kinds are
those of mathematics).20 The glue that holds these two elements together is Steiner’s
anthropocentric view concerning the applicability of mathematics. On this view,
mathematics is a human pursuit, it is a domain demarcated by the anthropocentric
values that guide its development. Thus, there seems to be no naturalist justification
for the apparent reliance on purely mathematical considerations as a guide to novel
scientific discovery.
The crux of Steiner’s argument concerns his account of what constitutes mathe-
matical, as opposed to physical, reasoning. It is a question of where the line between
physics and mathematics should be drawn. On this view, mathematics is a human
pursuit, it is a domain demarcated by the anthropocentric values that guide its devel-
opment. Thus, there seems to be no naturalist justification for the apparent reliance
on purely mathematical considerations as a guide to novel scientific discovery. In
this paper, we have presented two different approaches to this question.
In accounting for the success of the mathematical analogies underwriting the
gauge argument, the idealist and naturalist face different challenges. For the idealist,
the concern is to respond to Steiner’s appeal to a form of Pythagoreanism. The
strategy adopted in Section 4 is to highlight the constitutive role that mathematics
plays in scientific cognition. It was suggested that the analogies underwriting the
application of the gauge principle serve to extend the constitutive framework, through
which nature is understood, to a new domain. This framework entails that nature is
grasped in terms of the group structures that define the objective features of ‘reality’.
They serve as a necessary presupposition for the ‘gauge-theoretic’ worldview. In this
sense, one appeals to analogies to construct a theoretical harmony in our account
of nature. However, in adopting this idealist account, one takes a much stronger
view than Steiner concerning the role of mathematics in physics. The line between
mathematics and physics is not merely blurred, it is no longer existent. Thus, modern
theoretical physics is seen to be anthropocentric, in a similar sense as mathematics.
In contrast, for the naturalist, the most pressing worry is to avoid any form of
anthropocentrism. The strategy adopted in Section 5 is to portray the mathematical
description of the world in our physical theories as the outcome of a process of
scientific inquiry. The invariance requirement that initiates the gauge argument is a
major example of the way naturalist values (in the anti-anthropocentric sense) play
a role in this process.
20 For more on Steiner’s Pythagoreanism see Ben-Menahem (2021).
Mathematical Analogies in Physics: the Curious Case of Gauge Symmetries 29
The lingering concern for the naturalists is whether, in trying to avoid anthro-
pocentrism, they are forced to reduce their account of reality to the mathematical
concepts of our theories, and thereby adopt a strong form of Pythagoreanism. In
order to argue that the formal similarity underlying Pythagorean analogies should
be associated with a physical similarity, the naturalist needs to draw a line between
physics and mathematics. Without this line, it remains unclear what content, if any,
the claim for a physical similarity has beyond the mathematical similarity.
The heart of the naturalist account of gauge presented here is the conjectured
existence of a physical object that was not part of the interaction free theory. This
is the basis for the physical similarity between the different applications of the
argument. However, the motivation for this step is grounded in the formalism (the
existence of a preferred class of representations), and accordingly, at the end of the
day the account yields a mathematical description (“gauge field”) of the properties
required to define this preferred class of representations.
Is the naturalist account, therefore, no more than a form of Pythagoreanism? To
try to answer this question, let us note that while a gauge field is described mathe-
matically and has a similar form to familiar mathematical concepts (a connection),
it is also distinguished from such concepts due to its dynamical properties. The
difference between the fixed mathematical connection in equations (2), (4) and the
fields in equations (3), (6) demonstrates the difference. The state of the field is con-
tingent and dynamically influenced by physical properties such as mass and charge
of matter.21 These properties of the interaction are robust, and do not depend on
a realist, literal reading of the theory. It is enough to acknowledge that the gauge
field is a mathematical description of some aspect of the modal structure that makes
the empirical success of the theory possible. This role can not be fully understood
in terms of the mathematical properties of a connection. They are captured instead
in physical notions such as causality, action-reaction principle, scattering processes
etc., all of which are arguably essential non-mathematical parts of a physical theory.
It is not possible to account for the practice through which predictions are extracted
from the formalism without appealing to such non-formal notions. Whether these
aspects suffice to dispel the worries of Pythagoreanism depends, among other things,
on one’s definition of Pythagoreanism. We shall leave this question open-ended.
Another worry raised by Steiner is that many theoretical physicists seem to suffer
from “intellectual schizophrenia” (p. 73). They adopt a naturalist belief while at the
same time adopting “anthropocentric methods of discovering physical laws”. Here
again the naturalist and the idealist would disagree. From the naturalist perspective
presented here, Steiner’s problem is a genuine concern in the context of the gauge
methodology. It urges the naturalist on the one hand to emphasize the significance of
non-anthropocentric (or even anti-anthropocentric) values to the scientific practice,
21 Norton (1995) notes that Pauli as well as Weyl raised similar points in 1921 with respect to the
contingent and dynamical nature of the metric coefficients in general relativity. Regarding Yang
and Mills’s field, ’t Hooft (2005) (p. 3) similarly notes: ‘One could regard it as a mere mathematical
artifact; today we would call such a field a ’background field’. They [Yang and Mills] emphasize
that this would be physically unacceptable. If these fields exist at all, they must be endowed with
dynamical properties’.
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and on the other hand to to look for a material explanation for the success of the
argument as an alternative to Steiner’s anthropocentric explanation. For the neo-
Kantian idealist, this is not a concern, given that it is the constitutive framework of
scientific thought that serves to guide the broader application of mathematics in the
formulation of novel physical theories.
However, the problem is that this idealist account seems to entail that the empirical
success and failure of modern physics is, at least in part, based on a form of self-
deception. Nietzsche (1873/2010) expressed this view, in a discussion of natural law
from a Kantian perspective:
what is a law of nature as such for us, anyway? [...] all we really know is what we ourselves
bring to them—time, space, hence relations of succession and number. Everything wondrous
that we marvel at in the laws of nature, that demands explanation and could lead us to distrust
idealism, however, lies precisely and exclusively in the mathematical rigor and inviolability
of the representations of time and space. This, though, we produce in ourselves and out of
ourselves with the same necessity with which the spider spins its web; if we are constrained
to conceive all things only under these forms, then it is no wonder that we do in fact conceive
of all things in just these forms, for they must all bear in themselves the laws of number,
and number is precisely what is most astonishing in things. The lawlike uniformity that so
impresses in the orbits of the stars and in chemical processes ultimately coincides with those
properties we ourselves bring to things, so that it is we who are impressing ourselves. (p.
39-40)
To the Weylian idealist, the context has changed, but not much else. The ‘miracle’
of gauge theory is now simply contained within the mathematical representations
of the local group structures that underwrite our understanding of the abstract sym-
metries of modern physics. But on a ‘Weylian’ reading, both the ‘geometrical’
constitutive framework of classical physics and the more ‘abstract’ framework of
modern physics can be seen to ‘spring from the same source’, to paraphrase Weyl
(1918) and it is in this source that we can look to ground the ‘miraculous’ success of
gauge theory. From a naturalist point of view, this kind of account may be regarded,
at the most, as a description of mental, social or intellectual processes through which
certain mathematical concepts found their way into our theories. It cannot be re-
garded as explaining the empirical success or failure of those theories (that in many
cases came decades after the formulation of the theories).
On this backdrop, one may wonder to what extent we should regard the idealist
and the naturalist approaches as providing competing answers to the same set of
questions. Rather, they may merely be focused on different aspects of scientific
practice and thought. While these questions will not be settled here, it does seem
clear at this point that any meaningful discussion of them in the context of modern
physics has to faithfully describe the mathematical forms of reasoning employed in
theory construction. Steiner’s rich concepts of mathematical, formal and Pythagorean
analogies provide a general yet insightful framework for such a discussion.
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